5TH International Congress on Technology - Engineering & Science - Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia (2018-02-01)

The Diverging Clashes Of Neuro-philosophical Viewpoints On Qualitative Properties Of Consciousness

The research study is an exploration on the diverging neuro-philosophical viewpoints on consciousness that inevitably clashes one another as it poses unresolved queries on mind-body problem. Each school of thought exemplified consciousness on a heightened sphere causing destabilization and failure of convergence. This study depicts the viewpoints of epiphenomenalism, functionalism, eliminativism, dualism, representationalism, interactionism, parallelism, physicalism, and other related viewpoints. The study focuses on qualia epiphenomenalism. The study was conducted to the children of ,ordinary women farm workers not necessarily indigenous workers, of legal age, studying at Aklan State University. simply to assess their reactions/understanding to the above stated viewpoints. A plausible scientific paradigm of consciousness has been repudiated on the basis that attached to consciousness are qualia which are amenable to any scientific paradigm. What is missing in the previous endeavors, in neuro-philosophy, to endow an empirical context for qualia is that no authentic paradigm of research on consciousness has been advanced from the findings of researches and consequential experiments in neuroscience. Since qualitative properties are not causally efficacious other properties may be causally efficacious. There is congruence on the probability to adhere to irreducibility with respect to other properties. Thus, there is probability that the intentional properties are irreducible and epiphenomenal. They have no function in engendering the instantiation of intentional properties. In this sphere, belief/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not emerge due to epiphenomenal qualitative properties. These beliefs/memories in qualitative properties may happen without the occurrence of the corresponding qualitative properties. So, beliefs/memories must be both authentic and justified to be considered as knowledge. These beliefs/memories about epiphenomenal qualitative properties cannot be considered as knowledge and these epiphenomenal qualitative properties do not consist the possibility for cognition. Keywords: qualia-epiphenomenalism, neuro-philosophical, consciousness, physicalism, representationalism
Maria Imelda Nery, Glenn Tabasa